A cache memory unit needs to be shared among n strategic agents. Each agent has different preferences over the files to be brought into memory. The goal is to design a mechanism that elicits these preferences in a truthful manner and outputs a fair and efficient memory allocation. A trivially truthful and fair solution would isolate each agent to a 1/n fraction of the memory. However, this could be very inefficient if the agents have similar preferences and, thus, there is room for cooperation. On the other hand, if the agents are not isolated, unless the mechanism is carefully designed, they have incentives to misreport their preferences and free ride on the files that others bring into memory. In this paper we explore the power and limitations of truthful mechanisms in this setting. We demonstrate that mechanisms blocking agents from accessing parts of the memory can achieve improved efficiency guarantees, despite the inherent inefficiencies of blocking.
that memory without isolation. But, mechanisms that strive for non-trivial efficiency guarantees through memory sharing are susceptible to unfairness and user manipulation. Our goal in this paper is to design novel memory sharing mechanisms that optimize efficiency while guaranteeing fairness and truthfulness (i.e., non-manipulability).
A fundamental notion of fairness, known as sharing incentives in systems or proportionality in AI, asks that every user should always be at least as happy as she would be if memory isolation was used instead. Many of today's multi-tenant environments, including cache systems for cloud serving and big data storage (e.g., (Redis 2009; Memcached 2003) ), optimize efficiency by sharing all of the memory and using LRU or MRU to decide which files to keep in it. But, these policies are based only on the frequency of the requests and not on the identity of the requesting users, so they can inadvertently favor some users at the expense of others, and violate proportionality.
As fairness becomes more relevant in large computing systems (Verma et al. 2015; Ghodsi et al. 2013; 2011) , users demand individual quality of service guarantees (QoS) . A lot of recent work in AI focuses on building the foundations necessary to design new fair protocols for a variety of relevant settings (e.g., (Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang 2018; Fain, Munagala, and Shah 2018; Conitzer, Freeman, and Shah 2017; Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang 2016; Parkes, Procaccia, and Shah 2015; Goldman and Procaccia 2015; Dickerson et al. 2014; Friedman, Ghodsi, and Psomas 2014; Cole, Gkatzelis, and Goel 2013a; 2013b; Chen et al. 2013; Maya and Nisan 2012; Gutman and Nisan 2012) ).
The other important concern is the manipulability of the mechanism. For instance, users can manipulate some memory allocation policies by artificially inflating the frequency of their requests for some files. (Pu et al. 2016 ) experimentally demonstrated that strategically making excessive access requests for files can improve a user's average response time for the files that she actually wants. Strategic user behavior has also been observed in multiple other real systems (e.g., (Verma et al. 2015; Ghodsi et al. 2011) ). Two aspects of memory allocation that make the design of truthful mechanisms particularly challenging are i) the fact that memory is a non-rival good, i.e., multiple users can simultaneously benefit from its contents, and ii) the inability to use monetary payments to appropriately incentivize the users.
The fact that memory is a non-rival good permits a more effective utilization, but it can also lead to free riding, a phenomenon which is well documented in the economics literature (Groves and Ledyard 1977; Samuelson 1954) . The main cause of free riding is the fact that users can often enjoy the benefits of non-rival goods without contributing to their value, knowing that other users will do so. In Section 2 we provide an example of how this may arise in our setting. Confronting the free riding motives without resorting to memory isolation requires a careful mechanism design process that yields the desired incentives. The long literature on mechanism design has supplied us with several widely applicable tools, but the vast majority of these tools leverages monetary payments. Since the use of such payments would be unreasonable or infeasible in a memory allocation setting, we resort to the alternative approach of money burning.
Broadly speaking, a money burning mechanism may intentionally underutilize some resource, effectively "penalizing" some users, and simulating the impact of a monetary payment without the use of money. In our setting, we achieve this effect through the use of blocking. A memory allocation mechanism controls not only which files are brought into memory, but also the access rights that each user has on each file. So, for example, a file j can be brought into memory and the system can give some user i 1 full access to j, completely prevent another user i 2 from accessing it, while allowing partial access to some third user i 3 .
Recent work in systems has implemented memory sharing solutions attempting to address fairness (Kunjir et al. 2017) or incentive concerns (Yu et al. 2018; Pu et al. 2016 ). However, (Yu et al. 2018) argue that the system of (Pu et al. 2016 ) actually fails to prevent free-riding and, as it happens, the system proposed by (Yu et al. 2018) is not truthful either. The authors make the unusual assumption that it is acceptable for a user to lie, as long as this does not hurt the other users. However, basic game-theoretic arguments show that the resulting equilibria of the induced game among the users can actually end up hurting some of them.
Our Results
We study the extent to which we can optimize the efficiency of memory sharing mechanisms that are guaranteed to be truthful and fair. As a crucial tool in creating the right incentives for the users, we consider two types of blocking, which we refer to as uniform and non-uniform, with the latter being more powerful than the former (see Section 2 for formal definitions).
For instances with two users we show that uniformblocking mechanisms cannot provide non-trivial efficiency guarantees, but using nonuniform blocking can surpass this obstacle. Specifically, we provide a nonuniform-blocking mechanism that is 83%-efficient, which is close to optimal.
For instances with multiple users we show that uniformblocking mechanisms fail to achieve any constant approximation of efficiency. However, once again, we provide a nonuniform-blocking mechanism that performs much better; surprisingly, this mechanism can guarantee a 1 − 1 e ≈ 63% approximation of efficiency for all instances, even with an arbitrary number of users.
Model
A unit of cache memory is shared among a set N of n agents who need high-speed access to large data files. We virtually partition this memory into n equal-sized blocks, one for each agent. Each file is a sequence of bits and its total size is at least one block, allowing us to treat the files as divisible items. Each agent has a favorite "private" file that no other agent is interested in, and there is also a "public" file which corresponds to a massive dataset that multiple agents may wish to access. Our goal is to design a mechanism that elicits each agent's interest in the public file relative to her private one and decide how much of the public file should be brought into the cache, which private files it should replace, and how much access to it should be granted to each agent.
We denote the public file as file 0 and use j ∈ {1, ...n} to index the favorite private file of agent j. A memory allocation x x x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ) specifies, for each file j ∈ {0, ..., n}, the amount, x j , of this file that is in memory. For notational convenience we measure these amounts in blocks, i.e., x j = 1 means that the amount of file j in memory is equal to one block (a 1/n fraction of the memory) and x j ∈ [0, n] for all j. Each agent attaches a value to each file, which is proportional to the frequency with which the agent needs to access this file. Without loss of generality 1 , we normalize these values so that every agent's value for a block of her favorite private file is 1. We let v i ≥ 0 denote agent i's value for each block of the public file. If v i < 1, then agent i has a higher value for her private file than she has for the public file. We use v i = max{1, v i } to denote the maximum value of agent i between the public file and her private file.
Free Riding Example. In a setting involving two agents, if each of them used her block of memory for her private file, then they both receive a total value of 1, since they get no value from the other agent's private item. Now, assume that they both value the public item at 0.75 (less than their private item). If each agent used her half of the memory to store a distinct block of the public file instead, then they would each get a value of 0.75 from their own half, as well as an additional 0.75 from the other agent's half, leading to a total value of 1.5 for both; a considerably more efficient outcome. However, if the first agent brings a block of the public file in her own half and the second agent brings her private file instead, then the second agent's value becomes 1.75; she is effectively free-riding by taking advantage of the first agent's contribution without reciprocating.
Blocking Mechanisms
A memory allocation mechanism asks each agent i to report her value for the public file, it collects a bid b i (possibly different than the true v i ), and it outputs an allocation x x x as well as memory access rights for the agents. Using these access rights, the mechanism can choose to block agents from parts of the memory. We consider three types of mechanisms, depending on the extent to which they employ blocking. The no-blocking mechanisms cannot block the agents from any part of the memory. The uniform-blocking mechanisms can block the agents from accessing some parts of the memory but, if they choose to block-off something, then no agent can access it. This is equivalent to keeping some part of the memory empty, i.e., j∈M x j < n, where M = {0, ..., n}. Finally, the nonuniform-blocking mechanisms can block different agents from different parts of the memory. That is, instead of being able to access all of the x j amount of file j that is in memory, agent i can access only an f i,j fraction, i.e., f i,j ≤ x j .
Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to mechanisms that never block the agents from accessing any of the private files in memory, 2 i.e., f i,j = x j for all j ∈ [n], so the only relevant information is f i,0 , which we denote by just f i for clarity. Therefore, given a vector of reported values
) of values corresponding to the access to the public item allowed to each agent
Preferences and Incentives
Each agent's preferences over the possible outcomes of a mechanism are defined via a linear utility function that depends on the agent's valuation. Formally, the utility of agent i for allocation x x x, given blocking f f f , is
We also use u i (b b b) to denote the utility of agent i in the outcome that will arise if b b b is the set of bids reported. The linearity of the utility, which we discuss further in Section 6, is standard (Yu et al. 2018; Pu et al. 2016) , and it corresponds to the delay that the agent avoids due to the blocks of the file that are already in memory.
A mechanism is truthful if no agent ever has an incentive to lie, i.e., if for every agent i, every possible reported bid b i ∈ R, every b −i ∈ R (n−1) (every possible report of all other agents), and every true valuation v i , the mechanism
In other words, every agent's utility in the outcome that will arise if she is truthful is never less than her utility after any possible lie. Since our mechanisms are truthful, we often replace b i with v i .
Fairness and Efficiency
A mechanism is anonymous if its outcome does not depend on the "names" of the agents or the items and, hence, no permutation of these names would affect the outcome. A mechanism is proportional if the utility of agent i in every outcome of the mechanism is at least v i . These two properties ensure that each one of the participating agents receives individual QoS guarantees. That is, an agent cannot be discriminated against based on irrelevant information, and is guaranteed to receive her "fair-share" of the memory, i.e., the utility that she would receive if we isolated each agent to a 1/n fraction of the memory. We note that, although we use anonymity as an elementary notion of "symmetry" for our impossibility results, the mechanisms we provide in this paper actually satisfy much stronger symmetry properties.
A mechanism that yields a utility profile u u u = (u i ) i∈N for the agents is Pareto efficient if there exists no other feasible utility profile (u i ) i∈N such that, u i ≥ u i for very i ∈ N and u k > u k for some k ∈ N . In order to measure the efficiency of our mechanisms we use a common notion of approximate Pareto efficiency, initially defined in (Ruhe and Fruhwirth 1990 ). An outcome with utility profile u u u is ρ-Pareto efficient if there is no feasible utility profile in which, compared to u u u, every agent is more than 1/ρ times better off. We also prove a negative result for a much more demanding variant of this measure: we say that a mechanism with utility profile u u u is ρ-strongly Pareto efficient if there is no feasible utility profile in which, compared to u u u, no agent is worse off, and at least one agent is more than 1/ρ times better off.
An Example. Figure 1 displays a small 2-agent instance, where the public file is valued at v 1 = 5/6 and v 2 = 2/3. Then, v 1 = v 2 = 1. There are six possible (integral) allocations, which are represented as points in the utility profile space of the two agents (the points of the form (u 1 , u 2 )). E.g., the point (2, 0) corresponds to filling all the cache with agent 1's private item, and (5/6, 5/3) is from one block of the public item and one block of agent 2's private item. Note that no-blocking mechanisms are restricted to generating utility profiles that are convex combinations of these points, whereas blocking mechanisms can output any utility profile within the Pareto frontier. The point (v 1 , v 2 ) shows the minimum utility requirement that the proportionality constraint imposes. The dashed line in the figure defines the approximate Pareto region for an approximation factor of ρ = 80%, i.e., all the feasible utility profiles that are at least 80%-Pareto efficient. Figure 1 also shows what the approximate strong Pareto region looks like. The shaded blue region corresponds to all outcomes where the utility of agent 1 (the x-axis agent) is a 80% of the best it could be without hurting agent 2. Similarly, the shaded red region serves the analogous purpose for agent 2, and the intersection of these two regions is the approximate strong Pareto region.
No-Cooperation Mechanism
Before delving into blocking mechanisms, and to get a sense of the performance guarantees that we can achieve with a very simple no-blocking mechanism, we first briefly define the No-Cooperation (No-Coop) mechanism, which we can use as a benchmark for the subsequent results. This mechanism virtually partitions the memory into n blocks, and for each agent i it uses all of her block to store that agent's favorite item, i.e., either her private item if v i < 1 or, otherwise, the public one. As a result, if k agents prefer the public item, then x 0 = k. Note that this mechanism does not use any blocking, so all of the agents can access the portion of the public item that is in memory, but No-Coop does not attempt to identify room for cooperation among the agents that could yield higher efficiency outcomes. The following lemma, whose simple proof can be found in the full version of this paper, shows that No-Coop gives an approximation of exactly 1/n.
Lemma 3.1. The No-Coop mechanism is anonymous, proportional, truthful, and its approximation factor is exactly 1/n for both the Pareto and strong Pareto measures.
Memory Sharing with Two Agents
In this section, we study two-agent instances. Due to space constraints, the proofs are deferred to the full version of this paper.
Uniform Blocking
We begin by restricting ourselves to uniform blocking mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that either block none of the agents from accessing some part of the memory or all of the agents. We first show that no such mechanism can outperform the No-Coop mechanism in terms of efficiency.
Theorem 4.1. There exists no anonymous, proportional, and truthful uniform blocking mechanism with a (0.5 + ) Pareto approximation for a constant > 0.
Proof Sketch. Let I = (v 1 , v 2 ) denote an instance I where the value of the two agents is v 1 and v 2 respectively, and let δ be some constant such that δ 1−δ < . Then consider the instances I 1 = (1+δ, 0), I 2 = (1+δ, 1−δ), I 3 = (0, 1+δ), I 4 = (1 − δ, 1 + δ), and I 5 = (1 − δ, 1 − δ).
Using proportionality we can conclude that the outcome of I 1 needs to be (1, 0, 1); this outcome and the truthfulness of agent 2 imply the outcome of I 2 is also (1, 0, 1). Using a symmetric sequence of arguments, one can conclude that, facing problem instances I 3 and I 4 , the mechanism would need to choose the allocation (1, 1, 0) .
Finally, using the truthfulness of agent 1 between instances I 2 and I 5 and the truthfulness of agent 2 between instances I 4 and I 5 , we get a set of constraints in the allocation of I 5 which contradict the (0.5 + ) Pareto approximation claim. See the full version of this paper for more details.
Nonuniform Blocking: Lower Bounds
Having observed the limitations of uniform blocking mechanisms in (approximately) maximizing Pareto efficiency, we now turn to nonuniform blocking mechanisms. The main advantage of these mechanisms is the ability to penalize one agent without necessarily also penalizing the other. However, as we show in this section, despite the significant additional power that nonuniform-blocking mechanisms possess, they too fail to combine proportionality with 100% Pareto efficiency. In fact, no such mechanism can achieve more than a 91% approximation of Pareto.
Note that enabling nonuniform blocking enriches the design space for mechanisms and, as a result, proving the impossibility of an approximation factor becomes harder. In particular, the combinatorial arguments that we used in the proof of Theorem 4.1 become significantly more complicated. To overcome this obstacle, rather than using combinatorial arguments, we use duality theory. Theorem 4.2. There exists no proportional and truthful mechanism that can achieve a 91% Pareto approximation.
Proof Sketch. We first attempt to write a linear program whose solution corresponds to the mechanism with the optimal approximation factor. After discretizing the valuation space of the agents and defining a variable for each f i value of the mechanism, one can express (as a linear function) the utility u i (v i , b i , b −i ) of an agent i when the other agent reports valuation b −i , agent i reports b i , and her true valuation is v i . Given these variables, u i (v i , b i , b −i ), we express truthfulness, proportionality, and feasibility as linear constraints.
The objective is to maximize ρ, the Pareto approximation factor, such that the outcome of the mechanism is guaranteed to be within the ρ-approximate Pareto region. But, we run into the following issue: the intersection of the ρ-approximate Pareto region and the proportionality region in utility space is not always convex (see Figure 2) . This means that, without a creative change of variables, this region cannot be expressed using linear constraints. We therefore identify a set of reported value profiles of the two agents for which this region is convex (e.g., see Figure 3 ), and we drop the Pareto constraints for all other value profiles. The resulting linear program solves a relaxed, discretized, version of the initial mechanism design problem. However, using this formulation, we can now construct a dual program. A feasible solution to this dual program does, in fact, imply an impossibility result for nonuniform-blocking mechanisms. Using this technique, we construct a feasible (and quite complicated) solution for the dual which yields the inapproximability bound of Theorem 4.2; the proof as well as the primal and dual formulations can be found in the full version of this paper.
Nonuniform-Blocking: Upper Bounds
We now provide a mechanism that achieves a 83% approximation of Pareto. Although we cannot use payments, we provide an interpretation of any instance in our setting as one where each agent has a "budget", corresponding to the amount of her private item in memory, that she can "spend" in order to bring more of the public item in memory. The memory allocation mechanism can then be interpreted as an auction that defines the "price" that each agent needs to pay for accessing the public item. This mapping is very useful, as it enables us to use well-known results from mechanism design with payments in designing our mechanism.
Note that, if v 1 = v 2 = 0, i.e., both agents have no value for the public item, then any proportional mechanism would have to output the allocation (0, 1, 1), i.e., one block of each private item and none of the public item, otherwise one of the agents would get a value less than 1. We interpret this outcome as both agents having a budget of 1, which they are not willing to spend on the public item. Then, in instances where the value of v i is higher, the mechanism may give each agent i the opportunity to spend some of this budget in order to increase x 0 . Using this interpretation, when the two agents' reported v i values are high, i.e., when there is room for cooperation among them, we wish to design a mechanism that provides them with the opportunity to "buy-into" the public item, at the appropriate price. As a result, a good mechanism needs to address the tension between efficiency, truthfulness, and proportionality, by carefully deciding the rate at which an agent can trade her private item blocks for a fraction of the public item.
The seminal work of Myerson (1981) dictates what the structure of a truthful mechanism needs to be in a setting with actual monetary payments. It restricts the allocation rule to being monotone and it also defines the form that the pricing rule should obey. Given the interpretation of the private item as a budget, we derive an analog of Myerson's characterization, which (1) restricts the function x 0 (v 1 , v 2 ) implied by the mechanism to be (weakly) monotone, and (2) dictates the exact rate at which each agent i can exchange her private item for the public item as v i changes, i.e., exactly how fast x i needs to drop as a function of an x 0 increase. This allows us to only worry about choosing x 0 (v 1 , v 2 ). Lemma 4.3. A mechanism is truthful for agent i if and only if for any fixed value of v −i reported by the other agent, the following two properties are satisfied: 1. x 0 (v i , v −i ) is a monotone non-decreasing function of v i . 2. For some function c i (.) that depends only on v −i ,
We use this characterization to design the following mechanism, whose presentation will be in two parts. We first address what the mechanism does when neither of the agents prefers the public item to her private item, i.e., when v 1 ≤ 1 and v 2 ≤ 1. In this set of instances, our mechanism does not take advantage of its nonuniform blocking power and, instead, uses only uniform blocking. We then move on to describe the mechanism for the remaining instances, in which nonuniform blocking plays a crucial role.
Instances with v 1 ≤ 1 and v 2 ≤ 1. The mechanism that we propose, the Buy-In mechanism, decides how much of the public item to bring into memory as a function of the product v 1 v 2 . If this product is at least 1/4, then the amount of the public item that is brought into memory grows logarithmically as a function of v 1 v 2 . It starts from a value of x 0 = 0 when v 1 v 2 = 1/4 and it goes up to 4 3 ln 4 ≈ 1.84 when v 1 = v 2 = 1. The product v 1 v 2 captures, in a very symmetric fashion, the extent to which there is room for cooperation. Our mechanism allows the agents to take advantage of that, as the product increases. On the other hand, if the product is less than 1/4, the mechanism lets the agents keep their budgets unspent.
Given a function for x 0 (v 1 , v 2 ), the form of the x 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) and x 2 (v 1 , v 2 ) is implied, up to a constant transformation, by Lemma 4.3, in order to ensure the truthfulness. Since x 0 (v 1 , v 2 ) grows logarithmically with v 1 , Lemma 4.3 implies that x 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) should decrease linearly. However, the exact form of x 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) and x 2 (v 1 , v 2 ) that we have chosen below also ensures that the memory is never over-allocated, while providing good Pareto guarantees as well.
Algorithm 1: Buy-In mechanism for v 1 , v 2 ≤ 1.
Instances with max{v 1 , v 2 } > 1. Since we have not used nonuniform blocking so far, Theorem 4.1 implies that, to achieve more than 50% approximation, we must use nonuniform blocking in the remaining instances. A closer look at the proof of Theorem 4.1 reveals that a crucial truthfulness constraint relates to a deviation from an instance with v 1 > 1 and v 2 ≤ 1 to one with both v 1 ≤ 1 and v 2 ≤ 1. In other words, an agent who prefers the public item pretending to prefer her private one. For uniform-blocking mechanisms, this truthfulness constraint restricts the efficiency that can be guaranteed at the initial instance; nonuniform blocking alleviates these type of incentive issues. In particular, as the value of v i increases, the moment it exceeds 1, we exchange all of agent i's private item with an equal fraction of the public item, but block the other agent from accessing it. Furthermore, in terms of the allocation of the other agent, whether i reports v i = 1 or any v i > 1 makes no difference. In Algorithm 2, note that the value of x 0 (1, v 2 ) when v 2 ≤ 1 is borrowed from the Buy-In mechanism for both values are less or equal to 1, i.e., x 0 (1, v 2 ) = 4 3 ln (4v 2 ), and similarly for all other allocations of (1, v 2 ) or (v 1 , 1) when v 1 or v 2 ≤ 1.
Algorithm 2: Buy-In mechanism for max{v 1 , v 2 } > 1.
The non-trivial proof of the following result (see the full version of this paper) carefully analyzes the mechanism in terms of the tricky approximation measure based on Pareto efficiency.
Theorem 4.4. The Buy-In mechanism is anonymous, proportional, truthful, and it guarantees a 83% approximation of Pareto.
Instances with Multiple Agents
This section studies the power and limitations of anonymous, proportional and truthful memory sharing mechanisms for instances with multiple agents. Just like in twoagent instances, we show that uniform blocking mechanisms hit a significant road-block. The crucial information, which implies how much of the public item should be placed in memory, is how much the agents value the public item compared to their private item. If no agent values the public item then, clearly, none of it should be placed in memory. But, if enough agents have considerable value for this item, then they may benefit by sharing the public item using the memory that their private items would otherwise occupy. In this setting, even the task of figuring out the optimal outcome is not straightforward, let alone resolving the issue of agents misreporting their preferences.
We first prove that uniform blocking mechanisms fail to achieve any constant approximation of Pareto. We complement this result by providing a nonuniform-blocking mechanism that guarantees a 1 − 1 e ≈ 63% approximation of Pareto. The proofs missing from this section can be found in the full version of this paper.
Uniform Blocking
For the special case of two-agent instances where the agents prefer their private item, our Buy-In mechanism achieved a good approximation using only uniform blocking (Section 4). Surprisingly, we prove that all attempts to extend this result to n-agent instances are hopeless: even if all the agents prefer their private items, the ideas used by the Buy-In and, in fact, all uniform blocking mechanisms fail to achieve a constant approximation. Intuitively, when many agents are present, it becomes much more tempting to free-ride on the public item. Theorem 5.1. There is no anonymous, proportional and truthful uniform blocking mechanism that can guarantee a constant approximation of Pareto for any number of agents.
Proof Sketch. Since private items have value 1, if a sizeable group of agents report a value of 1/ √ n for the public item, any mechanism with good Pareto guarantees should bring in memory a lot of the public item. If a sequence of agents starts changing their valuation from 1/ √ n to 0, the proportionality property dictates that they should receive a block of their private file and Lemma 4.3 dictates that the deviating agents should "pay" something in exchange for any extra amount of this private file. The "payment" is the allocation of the public item. Since nonuniform blocking is not allowed, that payment has to affect all agents. This tension allows us to prove this very strong negative result.
To gain a better understanding of the effect that proportionality plays in the lower bound of Theorem 5.1, we also provide a lower bound that does not leverage this property. The following theorem shows that, even if we were willing to relax the proportionality constraint, no truthful and anonymous mechanism can combine an ω(1/ √ n) approximation of strong Pareto with a guarantee that every agent i gets a value of ω(v i / √ n). The proof uses similar ideas with the previous proof, but a longer sequence of deviations is required for the argument to go through. Theorem 5.2. No truthful and anonymous uniform blocking mechanism can simultaneously guarantee an ω(1/ √ n) approximation of strong Pareto and an ω(1/ √ n) approximation of proportionality.
Nonuniform Blocking
Our final result is the Opt-Out mechanism, an anonymous, proportional and truthful mechanism for instances with multiple agents that uses nonuniform blocking and guarantees a 1 − 1 e ≈ 63% approximation of Pareto. This mechanism begins with an allocation that places n blocks of the public item in memory. If there exists some agent i whose value for a block of her private item is greater than her value for n blocks of the public item, then a block of the public file is replaced by a block of file i, i.e., x i ← 1 and x 0 ← x 0 − 1. This agent i is then blocked from accessing any remaining fractions of the public item (f i = 0). Among the remaining agents, if there exists some other agent whose value for a block with her private item i is greater than her value for the remaining n − 1 blocks of the public file, the same process is repeated, and this continues until either all agents switch to their private files or no other agent prefers that switch.
Algorithm 3: The Opt-Out mechanism.
1 Let x 0 = n and S = {1, 2, . . . n}. 2 while there exists an agent i such that
Theorem 5.3. The Opt-Out mechanism is anonymous, proportional and truthful, and achieves a 1 − 1 e ≈ 63% approximation of Pareto.
Proof Sketch. Although proving that Opt-Out is anonymous, proportional, and truthful is relatively straightforward, the proof of the Pareto approximation is really nontrivial. We start by identifying the worst case instances for Opt-Out. Specifically, we show that among all n-agent instances, the instances where agent i reports v i = 1 n−i+1 (we call these "harmonic" instances) are the ones where the approximation factor of Opt-Out is minimized. Notice that in a harmonic n-agent instance, all agents choose their private file instead of participating in sharing the public file, which we refer to as having opted-out. In order to show that harmonic instances are the worst case instances, we show that given a worst case instance I where q < n agents opt-out, we can construct an instance I where an additional agent opts-out and the Pareto approximation in I is no better than the one in I. Therefore, we can focus on instances where all agents opt-out; among all such instances barely opting out is the worst case.
Having shown that harmonic instances are worst case instances for Opt-Out, in order to conclude the proof of Theorem 5.3 we need to also prove that the optimal allocation for an n-agent harmonic instance is not more than e e−1 times better than Opt-Out. Our approach works as follows. First, we constrain the optimal solution such that exactly k out of n agents get a non-zero amount of their private item. Subject to this constraint, we can characterize the optimal solution and pinpoint the agent who improves the most by switching from the allocation of Opt-Out. Her improvement is a function h(k, n) that we give a closed form for. We proceed to optimize h(k, n). We show that the gap in performance between Opt-Out and the optimal allocation is maximized for n going to infinity, and some k * ∈ Θ(n). The approximation ratio follows. More details are relegated to the full version of this paper.
Discussion
We conclude with a brief discussion on some central aspects of the memory allocation setting. We first briefly discuss why linear valuations are very-well justified in memory allocation. Then, we address how bidding and manipulation may actually take place in a real system where valuations are not necessarily reported by the users in the form of a bid. Finally, we also provide some additional context regarding the fairness constraint that we enforced.
Linearity of Valuations. First, this assumption is quite realistic in memory sharing: in a real system an agent's utility is proportional to the time the agent saves due to the cache. Each agent requests access to a file and needs to retrieve all of its memory blocks; accessing a memory block from the main memory takes time t 1 , while accessing a block from the cache takes much less time t 2 . Every time an agent finds a requested block in cache implies t 1 − t 2 time saved. Item valuations are proportional to their request frequency, hence, each item's contribution to an agent's utility is linear in the number of blocks of the item in cache and the valuation of the agent for the item. Equivalently, an agent's utility is proportional to its expected cache hit-rate (also see (Yu et al. 2018; Pu et al. 2016) , who make the same assumption). More importantly, the allocation outcome can be interpreted as time-sharing (the fractions correspond to how often a file is in memory) or a randomized choice of outcomes, in which case the linearity of expectation provides an alternative justification.
Direct Revelation Mechanisms. For simplicity's sake, we present our model as if the agents actually send a message to the mechanism, reporting their valuations. In reality, rather than eliciting bids, the system can just observe the agents' requests and regularly infer their valuations based on these requests. Due to locality of reference, memory access patterns are good predictors of future requests so there is no need for the agents to actually communicate their values. Analyzing direct revelation mechanisms, which are subsequently implemented as dynamic systems is very common (e.g., (Ghodsi et al. 2011; ).
Manipulation. Even if the mechanism observes the actual requests of the agents, the agents can still manipulate the valuations that the mechanism infers. Specifically, they can generate excessive spurious requests for an item that they do not really need, thus increasing its inferred valuation. At first glance it seems like an agent can hence only increase and not reduce a valuation, but this is not the case! Note that both proportionality and (approximate) Pareto efficiency are scale-independent measures (they are unaffected by scaling all of an agent's valuations by some constant). Hence, an agent can decrease its (relative) valuation for an item by simply generating excessive requests for all other items.
Proportionality Constraint. Finally, the proportionality constraint that we enforce on our mechanisms is one of the most fundamental and widely used measures in fair division, and it also known as "sharing incentives", "stand-alone", or "isolation guarantee" in systems. By default, memory is divided into equal pieces, isolating each agent i, but guaranteeing them a value of v i . Proportionality requires that switching from this naive solution to another outcome should be a Pareto improvement: no participant should be worse-off than this "outside option" that the isolation offers. This is an analog of what is known as "individual rationality" in mechanism design: no agent should lose value for participating.
